Swap file advice from IBM
/proc Tutorial
/proc Startup Script
sysctls
rc.local - Local Startup Script
Sendmail installation
Sendmail - after the installation
/etc/mail/access
Opinion Journal: Stopping Spam
/etc/syslog.conf example
System Log Rotation Script
Nightly Backup Bash Script
Apache Web Server Log Rotation Script
WU-ftpd ftpaccess file
iptables Startup Script
Bash Colors
.bashrc
Establishing File Ownership With Perl - All Users
Establishing File Ownership With Perl - One User legacy files:
RedHat 6.2 - after
RedHat 6.2 - before
ipchains startup script
RedHat 6.2 - Installed Packages
PAM for Red Hat Linux 6.2 - pam.login.html
PAM for Red Hat Linux 6.2 - pam.other.html
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Linux server pages: Files and Documentation for BIND: BIND-8.4.6 BIND-8.4.7 BIND 9 Apache Web Server: httpd-2.0.53 httpd-2.0.54 httpd-2.0.55 httpd-2.0.57 httpd-2.0.58 httpd-2.0.59 httpd-2.2.0 httpd-2.2.2 httpd-2.2.3 Sendmail Mail Server sendmail.8.13.3 sendmail.8.13.4 sendmail.8.13.5 sendmail.8.13.6 sendmail.8.13.7 sendmail.8.13.8 sendmailx Linux kernel files and documentation XFree Files and Documentation wu-ftpd tcp_wrappers qpopper procmail openssl openssh iptables berkeley-db Firefox-1.5 source |
DNS Complexity by Paul Vixie, Internet Systems Consortium http://www.acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=481 RRs used to describe downward delegations must be present both at the bottom edge of the parent (delegating) zone and at the apex of the child (delegated) zone. These records are expected to be identical, but differences are common and the meaning of such differences is undefined. The system is very robust in the face of this and other undefined conditions, and protocol agents are prepared to retry pretty hard - and try every possible data path - before giving up. (Thus are local configuration errors transformed into silent resource drains on the world at large.)
Inter-department memo from the MIS management
Attention: As many of you are aware, there are several security
protocols available for network authentication, such as PAP,
CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc. However, it has become necessary, due to
the increased ability of hackers to thwart these and other
defenses, to implement our own new, proprietary authentication
the Challenge-Response Authentication Protocol, or C.R.A.P.
We will begin installing C.R.A.P. on all servers and
workstations immediately. As soon as the laptops have gone
through the "C.R.A.P.-on-your-lap" upgrade program, the remote
users will have to go through C.R.A.P. to connect to the
network over a modem. Portable C.R.A.P. will not be very
different from desktop C.R.A.P., and both versions are expected
to generate similar quantities of paperwork.
Once all the machines have C.R.A.P. on them, we expect the
first round of bugs to appear. We will have extra support
personnel on hand to deal with bugs brought to light by the
presence of C.R.A.P.. Eventually, we expect to make the network
even less appealing to hackers by implementing additional
layers of C.R.A.P.. Once the C.R.A.P. becomes thick enough, we
don't think anyone will try to get in anymore. So, the next
time someone tells you that we have C.R.A.P. for security, you
can smile and proudly agree.
The MIS management